To improve the effectiveness of local governments in supervising hazardous materials transportation enterprises and to ensure transportation safety, this study applies evolutionary game theory to investigate the strategic interactions between local governments and hazardous materials transport enterprises. Based on the assumptions of bounded rationality and dynamic strategy adjustment, a payoff matrix is established, and an evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the decision-making behaviors of both parties. The stability and evolutionary trajectories of the system are analyzed through the Jacobian matrix, and MATLAB simulation tools are employed to verify the theoretical results and visualize the dynamic evolution process. Furthermore, a dynamic assessment mechanism from higher-level governments is introduced to develop a new dynamic payoff matrix, aiming to investigate the impact of a transport safety and quality-oriented dynamic assessment mechanism on the effectiveness of safety regulation. The results indicate that the implementation of the dynamic assessment mechanism can significantly enhance the effectiveness of safety regulation. Specifically, hazardous materials transportation enterprises are more likely to maintain a high willingness to comply with transportation regulations, while local governments tend to adopt stricter supervision strategies. As a result, the evolutionary strategies of both parties gradually converge to a stable equilibrium, thereby improving overall transportation safety. However, the application of such mechanisms should also fully consider the influence of environmental conditions and other uncontrollable factors on transportation safety to ensure fairness and effectiveness in performance evaluation.